O artigo discute a relação entre a noção de reterritorialização e a experiência fotográfica, buscando compreender uma dada experiência social de fotografar a cidade de Belém à luz de seus contextos de sentido: as dinâmicas históricas do que chamamos de “movimento fotográfico de Belém” e as vivências temporais dos sujeitos observados. Para ilustrar a problemática faz-se um recorte numa pesquisa etnográfica com nove meses de duração e acompanha-se uma “saída fotográfica”, uma passeio urbano de fotógrafos, transcorrido na noite da Trasladação, (...) que antecede a realização do Círio de Nazaré, em Belém. O artigo discute a fotografia enquanto processo de ressignificação e de sensibilizações do espaço urbano. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that, given its detachment from our current most successful science, analytic metaphysics has no epistemic value because it contributes nothing to our knowledge of reality. Relatedly, it is also argued that metaphysics properly constrained by science can avoid that problem. In this paper we argue, however, that given the current understanding of the relation between science and metaphysics, metaphysics allegedly constrained by science suffers the same fate as its unconstrained sister; that is, what is currently thought (...) of as scientifically respectful metaphysics may end up also being without epistemic value. The core of our claim is that although much emphasis is put on the supposed difference between unconstrained analytic metaphysics, in opposition to scientifically constrained metaphysics, it is largely forgotten that no clear constraining relation of metaphysics by science is yet available. (shrink)

The question “what is an interpretation?” is often intertwined with the perhaps even harder question “what is a scientific theory?”. Given this proximity, we try to clarify the first question to acquire some ground for the latter. The quarrel between the syntactic and semantic conceptions of scientific theories occupied a large part of the scenario of the philosophy of science in the 20th century. For many authors, one of the two currents needed to be victorious. We endorse that such debate, (...) at least in the terms commonly expressed, can be misleading. We argue that the traditional notion of “interpretation” within the syntax/semantic debate is not the same as that of the debate concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics. As much as the term is the same, the term “interpretation” as employed in quantum mechanics has its meaning beyond (pure) logic. Our main focus here lies on the formal aspects of the solutions to the measurement problem. There are many versions of quantum theory, many of them incompatible with each other. In order to encompass a wider variety of approaches to quantum theory, we propose a different one with an emphasis on pure formalism. This perspective has the intent of elucidating the role of each so-called “interpretation” of quantum mechanics, as well as the precise origin of the need to interpret it. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning. By Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin.

Carnap's conception of linguistic frameworks is widespread; however, it is not entirely clear nor consensual to pinpoint what is the influence of his stance within the traditional realist/anti-realist debate. In this paper, we place Carnap as a proponent of a scientific realist stance, by presenting what he called “linguistic realism”. Some possible criticisms are considered, and a case study is offered with wave function realism, a popular position in the philosophy of quantum mechanics.

‘Shallow’ and ‘deep’ versions of scientific realism may be distinguished as follows: the shallow realist is satisfied with belief in the existence of the posits of our best scientific theories; by contrast, deep realists claim that realism can be legitimate only if such entities are described in metaphysical terms. We argue that this methodological discussion can be fruitfully applied in Everettian quantum mechanics, specifically on the debate concerning the existence of worlds and the recent dispute between Everettian actualism and quantum (...) modal realism. After presenting what is involved in such dispute, we point to a dilemma for realists: either we don’t have the available metaphysical tools to answer the deep realist’s demands, and realism is not justified in this case, or such demands of metaphysical dressing are not mandatory for scientific realism, and deep versions of realism are not really required. (shrink)

We discuss the ‘Consciousness Causes Collapse Hypothesis’ (CCCH), the interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which consciousness solves the measurement problem. At first, it seems that the very hypothesis that consciousness causally acts over matter counts as a reductio of CCCH. However, CCCH won’t go so easily. In this paper we attempt to bring new light to the discussion. We distinguish the ontology of the interpretation (the positing of a causally efficacious consciousness as part of the furniture of reality) from (...) metaphysics (the metaphysical character of that consciousness). That distinction allows us to map the philosophical theories of consciousness compatible with quantum mechanics under the tenets of CCCH. Also, it indicates that the problem will have to be discussed at a metaphysical level rather than at the physical level. Our analysis corroborates recent arguments to the effect that this interpretation is not ruled out so easily. (shrink)

There have been two prominent ways of thinking about the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism: the first and more traditional way, in continuity with Husserl’s critique of psychologism, exhibits the incompatibility of phenomenology with all forms of naturalism and positivism; the second and more recent interpretive strategy attempts to naturalize phenomenology and make it consistent with current scientific accounts of consciousness and intentionality. In this paper I argue that despite the fact that Heidegger followed the first path and remained critical (...) of naturalism and positivism throughout his career, there are important moments in the late twenties where his project of a phenomenological ontology is challenged by problems pertaining to naturalism. I show how the question of determining the essence of life and animality as well as the overturning of ontology into metontology offer significant methodological hurdles for Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. (shrink)

This book argues that Hegel and Heidegger offer two divergent paths towards reconciling the dichotomy between nature and world inherited from modern philosophy. Raoni Padui traces the ways in which nature is incorporated into the domain of meaningful human dwelling that Heidegger calls “world” and Hegel calls “Spirit” or Geist.

This study provides empirical evidence on how corporate sustainability performance (CSP), as proxied by membership of the Dow Jones sustainability index, is reflected in the market value of equity. Using a theoretical framework combining institutional perspectives, stake-holder theory, and resource-based perspectives, we develop a set of hypotheses that relate the market value of equity to CSP. For a sample of North American firms, our preliminary results show that CSP has significant explanatory power for stock prices over the traditional summary accounting (...) measures such as earnings and book value of equity. However, further analyses suggest that we should not focus on corporate sustainability itself. Our findings suggest that what investors really do is to penalize large profitable firms with low level of CSP. Firms with incentives to develop a high level of CSP not engaging on such strategy are, thus, penalized by the market. (shrink)

This article examines the emergence of casuistical case analysis as a methodological alternative to more theory-driven approaches in bioethics research and education. Focusing on The Abuse of Casuistry by A. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, the article articulates the most characteristic features of this modernday casuistry (e.g., the priority allotted to case interpretation and analogical reasoning over abstract theory, the resemblance of casuistry to common law traditions, the ‘open texture’ of its principles, etc.) and discusses some problems with casuistry as an (...) ‘anti-theoretical’ method. It is argued that casuistry so defined is ‘theory modest’ rather than ‘theory free’ and that ethical theory can still play a significant role in casuistical analysis; that casuistical analyses will encounter conflicting ‘deep’ interpretations of our social practices and institutions, and are therefore unlikely sources of increased social consensus on controversial bioethical questions; that its conventionalism raises questions about casuistry's ability to criticize norms embedded in the societal consensus; and that casuistry's emphasis upon analogical reasoning may tend to reinforce the individualistic nature of much bioethical writing. It is concluded that, notwithstanding these problems, casuistry represents a promising alternative to the regnant model of ‘applied ethics’ (i.e., to the ritualistic invocation of the so-called ‘principles of bioethics’). The pedagogical implications of casuistry are addressed throughout the paper and include the following recommendations: (1) use real cases, (2) make them long, richly detailed and comprehensive, (3) present complex sequences of cases, (4) stress the problem of ‘moral diagnosis’, and (5) be ever mindful of the limits of casuistical analysis. Keywords: casuistry, interpretation, methodology, pedagogy CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This article begins with some preliminary remarks about the general features and basic varieties of reflective equilibrium in moral reflection. It then considers a couple of preliminary doubts about this method. One of these doubts claims that the most plausible interpretation of RE is so comprehensive that it risks paralyzing our thinking, while the other claims that this same version of RE is insufficiently determinate in practical contexts and will thus fail to be sufficiently action-guiding. The article then explicates the (...) sense in which RE qualifies as a coherence theory of justification, and considers several objections to RE that flow from its reliance on the putative connection between coherence and moral justification. (shrink)

This volume brings together original essays by many of the best and most prominent figures in the emerging field of biomedical ethics and presents them in a dialogue that significantly updates their earlier work. Focusing on the moral dilemmas that recent medical advances have created at both ends of the life course, the contributors discuss such issues as patient autonomy, hospital policies of risk-management, new developments in the abortion debate, genetic counseling and perinatal care, euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, testing and (...) treatment policies for HIV infection, and fairness in allocating health care and donated organs. (shrink)

A filosofia e os filósofos ocidentais, desde sua gênese na Grécia Antiga, acreditavam que apenas os gregos possuíam epistemologias e racionalidades. As sociedades africanas, por exemplo, eram consideradas a-históricas e tinham sua contribuição na estruturação do conhecimento científico negada pelos filósofos ocidentais. Durante muitos séculos, essa ideia foi difundida ao redor do mundo, inclusive, durante o projeto de colonização das Américas. Assim, o objetivo deste artigo é compreender, através de uma revisão bibliográfica, como a falta de reconhecimento dos povos diásporos (...) por parte da filosofia ocidental acarretou o silenciamento da filosofia africana, articulando os estudos em Ciência, Tecnologia e Sociedade como aliados no processo de descolonização do conhecimento da sociedade brasileira. Com o intuito de deslocar o pensamento do eurocentrismo, nosso referencial teórico é composto por filósofos pós-coloniais e/ou descoloniais, como Dantas, Ribeiro, Fanon, Quijano, dentre outros, que, através de seus estudos, evidenciam a necessidade de libertação do colonialismo presente na diáspora. De início, apresentamos, brevemente, o berço da filosofia ocidental, destacando a ausência da filosofia africana em sua concepção, e as duas ferramentas desenvolvidas pelo eurocentrismo para este fim: o epistemicídio e a colonialidade. Na sequência, relacionamos o conceito de descolonização com os estudos em CTS, uma vez que ambos visam a romper os paradigmas estabelecidos pelo modelo predominante de ciência. Por fim, nas considerações, apontamos os desafios e as perspectivas da educação brasileira sobre o ensino de filosofia africana, através de uma visão afroperspectivista, indicando possíveis caminhos para uma descolonização do conhecimento em sociedades afrodiaspóricas. As investigações, estabelecidas no presente artigo, têm como ponto de discussão a importância do ensino de filosofia africana em países afrodiaspóricos, especialmente no Brasil. A principal intenção, aqui, é apontar horizontes que vão além da filosofia ocidental. Palavras-chave: Filosofia africana. Ciência, Tecnologia e Sociedade. Afrodiaspórica. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer, filósofo do século XIX, conhecido como o “filósofo da vontade”, aborda a questão sobre o que é justiça e qual o papel do Estado em alguns parágrafos da sua obra ‘O mundo como vontade e representação’. Ele trata sobre conceitos morais e menciona o direito positivo como regulador da sociedade, mesmo tendo um embasamento no direito natural. O presente artigo pretende evidenciar qual a visão do filósofo sobre o conceito de vontade e como ela influencia diretamente na sua (...) concepção sobre o que é justiça. Partindo desse ponto, será mostrado como o Estado age para estabelecer o bem-estar social dos indivíduos diante da visão schopenhaueriana. (shrink)

This study investigates whether the market valuation of the two summary accounting measures, book value of equity and net income, is higher for firms with reputation for sustainability leadership, when compared to firms that do not enjoy such reputation. The results are interpreted through the lens of a framework combining signalling theory and resource-based theory, according to which firms signal their commitment to sustainability to influence the external perception of reputation. A firm’s reputation for being committed to sustainability is an (...) intangible resource that can increase the value of a firm’s expected cash flows and/or reduce the variability of its cash flows. Our findings are according to expectations and show that the net income of firms with good sustainability reputation has a higher valuation by the market, when compared to their counterparts. (shrink)

A textbook for undergraduates. Some 70 selections (more than half are new to this edition) follow an introductory essay. Current controversies (surrogacy, genetic engineering, proxy consent) are thoroughly covered. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

In this commentary, I critically discuss the respective views of Gert and Beauchamp–Childress on the nature of so-called common morality and its promise for enriching ethical reflection within the field of bioethics. Although I endorse Beauchamp and Childress’ shift from an emphasis on ethical theory as the source of moral norms to an emphasis on common morality, I question whether rouging up common morality to make it look like some sort of ultimate and universal foundation for morality, untouched by the (...) dialectics of time and reflective equilibrium, was an equally good move. As for Gert’s magisterial conception of common morality, I conclude that certain elements of his system are controversial at best and woefully inadequate at worst. He has a tendency to find in common morality what he himself put there, and his highly restricted conception of duties of assistance strikes this reader as ad hoc, inadequately defended, and unworthy of a project whose goal is to lessen the amount of misery in the world. (shrink)

Metaphysics is traditionally conceived as aiming at the truth — indeed, the most fundamental truths about the most general features of reality. Philosophical naturalists, urging that philosophical claims be grounded on science, have often assumed an eliminativist attitude towards metaphysics, consequently paying little attention to such a definition. In the more recent literature, however, naturalism has instead been taken to entail that the traditional conception of metaphysics can be accepted if and only if one is a scientific realist (and puts (...) the right constraints on acceptable metaphysical claims). Here, we want to suggest that naturalists can, and perhaps should, pick a third option, based on a significant yet acceptable revision of the established understanding of metaphysics. More particularly, we will claim that a fictionalist approach to metaphysics is compatible with both the idea that the discipline inquires into the fundamental features of reality and naturalistic methodology; at the same time, it meshes well with both scientific realism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Special Issue of Theoria entitled "Quantum Mechanics and Reality". We first comment on its origins related to the VIII International Workshop on Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information, promoted by the International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information. We then briefly introduce each contribution individually, bringing the papers together under the Special Issue's topic.

ABSTRACT Traditionally, being a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms of what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of a scientifically informed ontology. But according to some philosophers, a realistic attitude must go (...) beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics. (shrink)

I begin this commentary with an expanded typology of theories that endorse an internal morality of medicine. I then subject these theories to a philosophical critique. I argue that the more robust claims for an internal morality fail to establish a stand-alone method for bioethics because they ignore crucial non-medical values, violate norms of justice and fail to establish the normativity of medical values. I then argue that weaker versions of internalism avoid such problems, but at the cost of failing (...) to provide a clear sense in which their moral norms are internal or can ground a comprehensive approach to moral problems. Finally, I explore various functions that an internal morality might serve, concluding with the observation that, while there may be a core of good sense to the notion of an internal morality of medicine, our expectations for it must be drastically lowered. (shrink)

In this article, we reassess two of Mises’ core methodological claims. The first claim is that action is necessarily rational. The second claim is that all human minds share a logical structure. Neither claim can be unreservedly accepted but, we argue, both contain truth: Mises’ reflections remain important contributions to our understanding of action and the mind, hence to economics.

This is James Diggle's OCT , with a modified apparatus. The lacuna at 186 prompted two conjectures by Willink: υτθυ and the ingenious αλθυ . I wonder, however, whether an adverb is what we want: the anadiplosis of λακυ would not have come amiss to lend a touch of hysterical urgency to the cry of the rapist's victim; but that would not give us the rhythm we need . Something approaching the effect of the suggested anadiplosis might be obtained by (...) the supplement πoλλοσιυ. Although it lacks the palaeographical plausibility of αλθυ, it gives us an expression that is characteristically Euripidean in contexts pertaining to souls in torment: Ale. 185 πoλλυ δακρωυ, 938 πολλυ δ μχθωυ Su. 1119 ἂλγσι πoλλος, Tr. 28 πολλος δ κωκυτοσιυ, 38 δκρυα χουσα πολλ, etc. The adjective applied to sound is not unknown:Rh. 290–1 πολλι γᾰρ χι Θρικιοςωυ στρατς1στιχ. It can also be used to describe the frequency of sung laments accompanied by hysterical self-mutilation: S. El. 88–90 πολλς μυ θρυωυ ιδς, 1 πολλᾰς δ’ υτρις ισθxυ 1 στρυωυ πλαγᾰς αμασσομυωυ. (shrink)

This paper argues against recent post-Kantian readings of Hegel that overstate the role that the distinction between nature and spirit plays within Hegelian Idealism. In order to do so, it first differentiates between a transcendental and an ontological way of understanding such a distinction, arguing that the former is Kantian or neo-Kantian in nature while the latter is properly Hegelian. Then it demonstrates how Hegel attempts to both preserve the difference between the realm of nature and the realm of spirit (...) without turning it into a dichotomy, which he does by admitting a continuity of gradual stages or levels of conceptual development. Finally, the paper concludes that the coherence of Hegel’s attempt to simultaneously preserve and overcome the modern division between the natural and the spiritual rests on a view of reality that is closer to ontological pluralism than it is to either dualism or monism. (shrink)

According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the “measurement problem.” Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist’s mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) ---leaning on Whitehead’s solution to the mind-body problem--- offers a better metaphysical (...) understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science. (shrink)

There are many good reasons for a merger between bioethics and human rights. First, though, significant philosophical groundwork must be done to clarify what a human right to health would be and—if we accept that it exists—exactly how it might influence the practical decisions we face about who gets what in very different contexts.